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summary
In this article the author discusses the problem relating to the tax competition 
in  the context of  relocation as  a  process resulting from the ongoing globalization 
of  economic activity. For this purpose the author discusses the essence and causes 
of  tax competition and relocation. The  conclusion is  that relocation leads usually to 
an increase in  the competitiveness of enterprises, their development, and thus to the 
development of  the economies of  individual countries. Healthy competition leads to 
streamlining the fiscal policies of competing countries and to the creation of a busi-
ness-friendly atmosphere. Therefore, the role of  governments, particularly in  the de-
veloping countries, is  such action, including the use of fiscal instruments, that would 
enable the achievement of competitive advantage in the international market and so-
cio-economic development.
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Unquestionable positive effects of  globalization are an increase in  trade1 
based on comparative advantage, cross-border investments, institutional devel-
opment, the competitiveness of  individual companies and whole economies, 
as  well as  other desirable for societies, regional and national consequences 
arising from the more creativity of  people in  the world disappearing barri-
ers and boundaries. Of course, one can not disregard some negative effects 
that may affect countries at the periphery of  the importance of  government, 
as well as beyond the sphere of economic interest of  investors2.
The existing tax competition between countries is  often seen as  a mani-
festation of  their competition to attract the potential investors and capital to 
enhance the growth of national economies. The mobile factors of production 
(e.g. capital) are easily relocated to countries with low tax levels, which limits 
the possibility of  taxing them excessively3. The  clou of  tax competition fre-
quently lies in the belief that a minimum fiscal burden is the main determiner 
of the economic development of the area involved and of its attractiveness for 
new investments. According to Robert W.  McGee, countries with the low-
est tax rates tend to have the highest rate of economic growth, as  lower tax-
es leave more field for private capital, which normally operates far more ef-
ficiently4. Creating incentives for investment is  especially important for the 
countries which are under economic transformation because the transforma-
tion process is  largely affected by FDIs5. Since the general level of  capacity 
for market competition and investment attraction is  obviously related to the 
fiscal environment, it  would be hard to deprive individual countries of  their 
right to develop their own fiscal models to match their potential and needs. 
 1 See R.L. Thompson, Globalization and the benef its of  trade, „Chicago Fed Letter”, 
The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, No. 236/2007.
 2 D.  Rodrik, Globalisation, Social Conflict and Economic Growth, „The World Economy”, 
Vol.  21, No.  2/1998, p.  143-158. B.M. Gilroy, Globalisation, multinational enterprises and 
European integration, MPRA, Paper No. 17972/2001, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17972/ 
(12.02.2013).
 3 See G.R. Zodrow, Capital Mobility and Source-Based Taxation of  Capital Income in  Small 
Open Economies, „International Tax and Public Finance”, Vol. 13, No. 2-3/2006, p. 269.
 4 R.W. McGee, The Philosophy of Taxation and Public Finance, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Boston-Dordrecht-London 2004, p. 105-107.
 5 M. Sedmihradsky, S. Klazar, Tax Competition for FDI in  Central-European Countries, 
CESifo Working Paper, No. 647/2002; B.S. Sergi, Slashing taxes on corporate profits. Does it help 
entrepreneurship?, „Transformations in Business & Economics”, Vol. 4, No. 2(8)/2005, p. 21-35.
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The purpose of  this article is  to present the issues relating to the reloca-
tion of  companies in  terms of  striving for optimal income taxation by using 
tax competition. Moreover, this article is intended as a contribution to the re-
sponse to the still relevant question: what is the importance of the relocation 
process for the economies, for whom is it more potential opportunity, and for 
whom it  may pose some risk due to the dynamic development and increase 
competitiveness in  the globalizing world.
1. the nature of tax competition
Business activity is profit-oriented by nature, and every tax burden means 
a  reduction in  the present or future capital assets of  taxpayers. With regard 
to the corporate income tax, direct taxation reduces the scale of  either con-
sumption or business expenditure. Therefore the natural taxpayers’ response 
is  avoidance of  such consequences of  taxation or the drive to at least mini-
mize its negative impact. The taxpayers’ responsive behaviour may involve tax 
optimization within the limits allowed by law, i.e. making use of the tax struc-
ture flexibility, or tax-driven migration, frequently referred to as  relocation6, 
i.e. moving the operations to another country. Therefore, the natural behavior 
of the taxpayer is  to avoid such tax consequences or to minimize its negative 
impact. Proceedings taxpayer may bring, among others, to legally optimize the 
level of  taxation through the use of flexible tax structure or by tax migrating 
to countries with lower tax weights, taking advantage of  the tax competition 
between countries.
Tax competition is a phenomenon which consists in the governments’ ap-
plying fiscal instruments to increase the competitive advantage of  their ter-
ritories by attracting or keeping the capital engaged in  economic activity. 
It  should also be remembered that multinational corporations7 are to a  large 
extent motivated by their drive to reduce tax burdens applicable to their op-
erations. Therefore, they appear highly sensitive to the level of  taxes levied 
on  their line of business in any given country8. Tax competition may be per-
ceived as  beneficial and may develop – per analogiam to business competi-
 6 See E.E. Leamer, The  Effects of  Trade in  Services, Technology Transfer and Delocalisation 
on Local and Global Income Inequality, „Asia-Pacific Economic Review”, 1996, p. 44-60.
 7 See P.  Dicken, Global Shift: Transforming the World Economy, Paul Chapman Publishing, 
London 1998.




tion – to approximate the ideal competition9 in which the countries or regions 
compete for mobile factors of production.
Observation of a process of tax competition allows one to distinguish two 
forms of  this phenomenon10: crawling tax competition and – following the 
terminology of the European Commission – unfair tax competition. The first 
form involves a long-term, comparatively slow process where states are under-
bidding (as initiators or as  reaction to the measures of  the other players) the 
tax rates of their competitors in several rounds so that gradually the tax rates 
of all participating players are converging downwards.
Crawling tax competition refer to regular tax systems and usually con-
cern all investors regardless whether they are domestic or foreign11. Of par-
ticular relevance is direct tax competition for foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and portfolio investment (PFI) via reductions in  the nominal corporate tax 
rates, but also the introduction of dual income tax systems in several member 
countries to privilege capital incomes12.
The unfair tax competition comprises isolated attacks of single states with 
the only aim to undercut the other states in the direct competition for foreign 
investment; therefore it is sometimes called “tax dumping”13. It is worth men-
tioning, however, that economic literature explains this concept in  different 
ways. An opinion may be found that reduction of  tax rates for all econom-
ic agents (both domestic and foreign) is treated as tax competition. However, 
tax privileges only for foreign investors should be treated as  tax dumping14. 
The  professional literature also includes an approach in  which tax competi-
tion may lead to a  “race to the bottom” in  lowering the tax rates. The coun-
 9 C. Tiebout, A  pure theory of  local expenditures, „Journal of  Political Economy”, Vol.  64, 
No. 5/1956, p. 416-424.
 10 J. Sepp, R.M. Wróbel, Tax Competition and EU Enlargement: Strategies within a Developing 
Political-Economic Environment, [in:] U. Ennuste and L. Wilder (ed), Essays in  Estonian 
Transformation Economics, Estonian Institute of  Economics at Tallinn Technical University 
2003.
 11 A. Krajewska, S. Krajewski, Is Corporate Income Tax Harmonization Possible in an Enlarged 
European Union?, „Buletin Stiintific”, International Society for Intercommunication of  New 
Ideas, 2007, p. 154.
 12 M. Schratzenstaller, Corporate Taxation in  Europe – Possibilities, Problems and Options for 
Reform, Network of  Alternative Economists in  Europe, Workshop in  Stockholm, Working 
Paper, No. II/29/2000.
 13 H.G. Grigat, Verlagerung von Unternehmensgewinnen in  das Ausland und Steuerdumping, 
WSI-Mitteilungen, No. 6/1997, p. 404-414.
 14 See G.  Krause-Junk, Was ist fairer Stenerwettbewerb?, [in:] R. Hasse, K.  E. Schenk, 




tries competing in  tax burdens bring them lower and lower to prevent the 
mobile factors of  production from running away from high-tax countries to 
low-tax ones15. Hans-Werner Sinn claims that the “race to the bottom” – lead-
ing to a zero tax in the extreme – would ruin the economy16. Countries with 
relatively inefficient tax systems can experience significant welfare losses if, 
as  a  byproduct of  financial integration, they find themselves competing over 
capital income taxes against countries with relatively efficient tax systems17.
It should be emphasized, however, that a  straightforward comparison 
of  nominal CIT rates is  merely a  starting point for any comparative analy-
sis of national tax systems and does not offer a complete picture of  their ac-
tual arduousness to companies. This is  so because individual countries calcu-
late the tax base in different ways. There are many sources of such differences: 
the range of  costs qualifying as  business expenses, the depreciation method 
applied, the method of  reserves creation and accounting for losses, the ap-
plicable tax reliefs and credits and so on. Therefore, getting a  complete pic-
ture requires the use of effective rather than nominal tax rate for comparison. 
It is only the more favourable effective tax rate that may induce businesses to 
move their operations as foreign direct investment into countries offering less 
burdensome taxation. 
Besides, we should remember that tax burden is  just one of  several rea-
sons for transferring production to another country18, and not the most im-
portant one at that. The business attractiveness of any country has numerous 
aspects, including the levels of  social security, transport costs, infrastructure 
development, labour education or the condition of  natural environment19. 
The  main factors are invariably the cost and quality of  labour as  well as  the 
size of  markets and the distance from key customers. It  is only when those 
non-fiscal factors look favourable that the tax burden really comes into play.
From the comparison of  the CIT rates offered and the ranking of econ-
omies by their competitiveness it  can easily be inferred that it  is not the tax 
 15 A. Razin, E. Sadka, International Tax Competition and Gains from Tax Harmonization, 
„Economics Letters”, Vol. 37, No. 1/1991, p. 69-76.
 16 H.W. Sinn, How Much Europe? Subsidiarity, Centralization and Fiscal Competition, „Scottish 
Journal of Political Economy”, Vol. 41, No. 1/1994, p. 85-107.
 17 E.G. Mendoza, L.L. Tesar, Why hasn’t tax competition triggered a  race to the bottom? Some 
quantitative lessons from the EU?, „Journal of  Monetary Economics”, Vol.  52, No.  1/2005, 
p. 163-204.
 18 J.M. Gryko, M.  Kluzek, The  influence of  the tax factor on  investment effectiveness in  select-
ed Central and Eastern European countries, „Transformations in Business & Economics”, Vol. 7, 
No. 3(15)/2008, p. 65-74.
 19 Economic and Social Committee, Economic and Social Committee Opinion On Direct com-
pany taxation, ECO/091, CES 850/2002, Brussels 2002.
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burden (resulting from the effective tax rate), but other factors like the effi-
ciency of  public institutions, the transparency of  public management or the 
quality of natural environment that secure any country’s high position in  the 
attractiveness ranking20. By way of  an example, if  we rank European coun-
tries by their CIT rates, the lowest rates are offered by Albania, Bulgaria and 
Cyprus while the highest by Malta, Belgium and France. However, when the 
GCI is  used to build a  competitiveness ranking, the most competitive econ-
omies are those of Switzerland, Finland and Germany and the least compet-
itive ones – Serbia, Albania and Greece. 
In conclusion, the countries which are keen to retain investors’ interest 
with more friendly taxation earn more tax revenues from new investors de-
spite lowering the tax burden, and this is  attributable to the effect of  scale. 
On the microeconomic scale the same effect is achieved by a business which 
earns huge profits despite a small profit margin. It manages to do so through 
large sales volumes, reached through offering good value for money.
2. the  implications of relocation to the economic sphere
Relocation is  a relatively new form of  business adaptation to a  chang-
ing environment21. The relocation process is manifest in the transborder flows 
of  foreign direct investment. The  actual scale of  this phenomenon is  hard-
ly measurable, the difficulty lying inter alia in  the fact that relocation func-
tions alongside offshoring and outsourcing. Due to the disparity between the 
economies of the EU Member States, and between that of the EU as a whole 
and those of Asian countries, there are certain factors that encourage compa-
ny relocations: cheaper supply, tax advantages, potential access to new mar-
kets, technology and lower labour costs.
Relocation is  a form of  adaptation to a  changing business environment. 
In the literature one can find three main causes of migration enterprise: 1) in-
ternal factors (status, ownership, size, age, employment growth, acquisitions, 
mergers,), 2) factors related to the location (location of company headquarters, 
the type of  industrialization and characterization objects), 3) external factors 
(market size, labor market issues, government policies and general economic 
 20 See World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011, Geneva, 
Switzerland 2010 and KPMG International, KPMG’s Corporate and Indirect Tax Survey 2012, 
www.kpmg.com (15.09.2013).
 21 J. van Dijk, P.H. Pellenbarg, Firm relocation decisions in The Netherlands: An ordered logit ap-
proach, „Papers in Regional Science”, Vol. 79, No. 2/2000, p. 191-219.
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conditions)22. While the list of internal factors is almost complete, knowledge 
about the external factors is not exhaustive. Full knowledge of these particular 
factors may be crucial to explain the reasons for the migration of enterprises23.
The development of business and the need for adequately large space for 
the production represents here the main drivers for the migration. When an 
entity reaches the limits of its capacity is somehow forced to relocate their ac-
tivities. Another reason for the relocation is cost optimization, therefore com-
panies use all circumstances and are looking for other places conditions, which 
are favorable, e.g. using economies of  scale, improved access to raw materials 
and energy sources, differences in  the level of wages, raw material prices and 
energy, as well as any incentives made by local authorities.
In addition, companies are motivated by a specific government policy us-
ing fiscal instruments, including grants, low taxes, tax etc. It  should be em-
phasized, that this strategy was used by the authorities in most industrialized 
countries since the 50s 20th century, mainly in  order to reduce income dis-
parities between regions and employment growth. Here one can mention the 
following types of  migration enterprise24: 1) integral migration - the whole 
company moves to a new place, and partial migration - part of  the company 
is  transferred to another location for a period of reconstruction/development, 
2) the permanent or temporary migration - the entire company or a  part 
thereof is  transferred to another location for the duration of  reconstruction/
extension, 3) vertical migrations - the company moves from the big city to 
the suburbs or to a  smaller town, and horizontal migration - the company 
moves to another city or another area of  the same rank 4) inter-regional, in-
tra-regional or international.
According inter alia to Leo Sleuwaegen25, nature of the relocation chang-
es over time. Decades ago, the phenomenon was somewhat reflected the life-
cycle model. The  production of  some goods after reaching the peak phase 
of  the growth cycle was transferred from the more developed countries to 
less developed countries, which prolonged the life expectancy of  these prod-
ucts and ensure profitability. But now, the significance of economies of  scale, 
 22 See J.  van Dijk, P.H. Pellenbarg, Demography of  firms; spatial dynamics of  firm behaviour, 
„Netherlands Geographical Studies”, University of  Groningen, No.  262/1999; J.  van Dijk, 
P.H. Pellenbarg, Firm relocation…, op.  cit., Vol. 79, No. 2/2000, p. 191-219.
 23 A.E. Brouwer, I. Mariotti, J.N. van Ommeren, The  firm relocation decision: a  logit model, 
European Regional Science Association conference papers, 2002, p. 1.
 24 E. Małuszyńska, Delokalizacja przedsiębiorstw, „Wspólnoty Europejskie”, No. 3(172)/2006, 
p. 3.
 25 E. Pennings, L. Sleuwaegen, G. Monmaerts, Relocation, an Element of Industrial Dynamics, 
Federal Planning Bureau, Brussels 2000, p. 4-5.
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and the process of globalization and greater flexibility in the operation of en-
terprises, result in  the formation of  transnational corporations. 
The relocation process manifests itself in  the form of  international flows 
of  FDIs, but the actual scale of  this phenomenon is  difficult to measure. 
The  reason for this difficulty lies in  the fact that in  addition to the concept 
of  relocation also operate offshoring and outsourcing concept. The  relocation 
of  the enterprise would be rather identified with the transfer of  production 
existing in the other place, which is associated with job losses at existing op-
erations. However, determination of  offshoring and outsourcing is  not clear-
ly indicated26. Offshoring is understood as the transfer of production (or pro-
curement) of  the country where the company is  located in  another country, 
usually characterized by lower labor costs. This phenomenon may, but need 
not, take place within a company.
However, the phenomenon of  outsourcing is  the  contracting out 
of a business process to a third-party27. Relocation thus provides both a sim-
ple production function (offshoring) transferred to countries with more fa-
vorable economic conditions, as  well as  services and other activities carried 
out so far in the home country of the investor (highly developed economies). 
These activities are aimed at maintaining competitive advantage by corpora-
tions globally. They decide to deepen expertise in  key strategic activities for 
the company while releasing and giving out less significant strategic actions. 
Outsourcing these activities on  behalf of  another, cooperating, specialized 
in  the field of  the company allows enterprises to significantly reduce operat-
ing costs. This results not only from the lower rates offered to the workforce, 
but also to make better use of  information and communication technologies 
that enable the collection, processing, transmission, and flexible delivery ser-
vices to the customers in remote locations around the world, in terms of work 
for two or three shifts and different time zones28.
In the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) 
relocations can be estimated due to the positive and negative consequences as-
sociated with it. Moreover it should be mentioned that relocation of industri-
al production can, at best, help to promote social rights in countries receiving 
investment and necessarily involves the regular transfer of know-how; conse-
 26 E. Małuszyńska, op.  cit., p. 4.
 27 E. Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, Narodowe regulacje na rynku wewnętrznym UE: nowe bariery we 
współpracy, [in:] E. Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (ed.), Unia Europejska w gospodarce światowej – nowe 
uwarunkowania, SGH, Warszawa 2007.
 28 M. Wdowicka, Ewolucja działania korporacji transnarodowych i  jej znaczenie w  go-spodarce 
lokalnej, [in:] J.J. Parysek, Bogucki (ed.), Wybrane problemy miast i  aglomeracji miejskich na po-
czątku XXI w., Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Poznań 2009, p. 73-74.
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quently relocation can make a considerable contribution to further increasing 
the competitiveness of  the relocated businesses29.
However, the negative effects would be rather linked to the relocation 
outside the EU, particularly, when the relocation phenomenon, apart from be-
ing the direct cause of  job losses, could also bring other, associated problems, 
such as  an increase in  social security costs for governments, increased social 
exclusion, lower tax revenues to the budget and less economic growth overall, 
partly as  a  result of  a general demand shortfall. In addition, European com-
panies may be somewhat forced to compete with companies with lower costs. 
This reduces the pressure to increase spending on R&D and the effect of re-
ducing their potential for innovation. Assuming that it’s inevitable occurrence 
of  the relocation, the EESC believes that the best way of  tackling the un-
derstandable concerns over the negative consequences of company relocations 
is  to develop and properly implement social policies that promote a  positive 
attitude to change, enable workers to adapt and upgrade their skills, and en-
courage job creation30.
The analyzes also show that the assumption underlying the criticism 
of  relocation, it’s not always true, and the scale of  the impact of  relocation 
phenomenon is  exaggerated. So that the “export” of  jobs to low-cost coun-
tries, to which production is transferring, contributes to the rise in unemploy-
ment in European countries. The  jobs moving overseas doesn’t have to mean 
the loss of  jobs in  developed countries. On the contrary, it  may be even in-
crease the number of  jobs in  the home country, because foreign subsidiaries 
are not necessarily in competition with national production company, but of-
ten they’re complementary to it  and help improve the efficiency, quality and 
reduce production costs, which results in  increased sales. This may lead to 
increased employment in  the home country. However, an advantage in  at-
tracting new investment and jobs are mainly those countries which produce 
at competitive prices31.
It should be noted that relocation to countries with low wages and low 
skills are very limited scope in terms of the whole economy. The negative im-
pact of  competition from low-wage countries is  concerned especially at the 
low qualifications32. According to the European Commission report on  em-
 29 See Economic and Social Committee, European Economic and Social Committee Opinion On 
the scope and effects of  company relocations, OJ C 294/09 of 25.11.2005.
 30 Ibidem.
 31 N.G. Mankiw, P.  Swagel, The  Politics and Economics of  Offshore Outsourcing, American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, Research Working Paper No. 122/2005.
 32 J. Gorter, P. Tang, M. Toet, Relocation from the Netherlands: motives, consequences and poli-
cy, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, CPB Document No. 76/2005.
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ployment, nearly three quarters of the total number of  jobs lost due to inter-
nal restructuring, more than 13 percent is the result of bankruptcy or closure, 
3 percent is  the result of mergers and acquisitions, and for more than 7 per-
cent be attributed to relocation of production activities, including 2.5 percent 
attributable to outsourcing. Similar assessment of  the scale of  relocation due 
to the UNCTAD study. The  majority of  relocation takes place within indi-
vidual countries, and the migration of business on an international scale cov-
ers only 1-2 percent of cases33.
All in  all, the relocation process should be beneficial for the whole global 
economy. Firstly, it makes the highly developed countries get rid of the less ad-
vanced sectors of economy and utilize their highly skilled labour more efficient-
ly in  the high-tech industries – the use of  comparative advantages will facili-
tate their sustainable economic growth and welfare. Secondly, the host countries 
gain not only new jobs, but also an increased inflow of  FDIs and know-how, 
thus securing their own economic growth. One can only have some concerns 
if the process of relocation refers to the business, which was financed with pub-
lic funds, especially from the EU funds under cohesion policy. This was, inci-
dentally, reflected in  legislation restricting the use of  the Structural Funds34.
conclusions
Tax policy set to reduce tax rates seems a  very reasonable one, provided 
that it  leads to the overall diminishing of  tax burdens, made up of  not on-
ly rates but also other elements of  the tax system structure. Douglas Holtz-
Eakin and Harvey S. Rosen demonstrated that raising the tax rates results 
in a slow-down in business activity as companies accumulate less capital and 
create fewer jobs35. Their study covered the years 1985-1988 and thus man-
aged to embrace the outcomes of Ronald Regan’s tax reform. 
 33 European Commission, Employment in  Europe 2004. Recent Trends and Prospects, 
International Publication, Paper 36/2004, http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/intl/36 
(21/03/2013), p. 218.
 34 See Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions 
on  the Structural Funds, OJ L 161 of  26.6.1999 and Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 
of  11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on  the European Regional Development Fund, 
the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999, 
OJ L 210 of 31.7.2006.
 35 D.  Holtz-Eakin, H.S. Rosen, Economic Policy and the Start-up, Survival, and Growth 




Healthy competition leads to streamlining the fiscal policies of  compet-
ing countries and to the creation of a business-friendly atmosphere. The com-
petition for investment capital is  not a  zero-sum game which must have its 
winners and losers, especially in long-term perspective. The competing parties 
behave rationally in their efforts to secure the optimum environment for eco-
nomic entities, increasing the efficiency of their public finance systems on the 
way. This should translate into improved living conditions of  the population.
However, we must remember that the income taxation level is  not the 
most significant in making a national economy competitive. Countries which 
enjoy high-quality infrastructure, stable and transparent legal and tax systems 
and a  large proportion of  highly-qualified labour need not fear that inves-
tors will seek greener pastures and can keep their taxation relatively high. 
Conversely, the countries which are at a relatively lower level of development 
and have less capital offer lower taxation in compensation for their infrastruc-
tural shortcomings to remain at least moderately attractive for investors.
Creation of  a stable framework for business activity and supporting the 
investment and developmental projects become more and more important to-
day as globalisation of economic processes eliminates those who cannot keep 
up with their competitors and gain a sustainable competitive advantage.
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